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DIRECTIONALITY AND FRAGMENTATION 
IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 
Ralph D. Ellis 
In The Transcendence of the Eqo, Sartre denies that 
there can be a transcendental ego in the Husserjian sense 
or in any sense resembling the Husserlian one. The ego, 
he says, is an object for, not a content in consciousness. 
Consequently, Sartre does not regard the ego as having the 
status of a pure, disengaged consciousness which would 
remain intact after all implicit, but questionable 
presuppositions, had been bracketed out by means of the 
phenomenological reduction. Rather, in Sartre's view the 
character and identity of the ego becomes uncertain and 
nebulous as a result of the reduction. This denial of the 
subjectively conscious transcendental ego then becomes one 
of the basic tenets of the worldview he develops in Being 
and Nothingness. I shall suggest, however, that such a 
denial puts the whole phenomenological movement in 
jeopardy t>y needlessly removing an essential element from 
its methodological foundation. The goal is to restore 
this element. 
According to Husserl, (1) the transcendental ego 
consists ontologically of our immediate consciousness in 
its subjective purity; because this immediate 
consciousness remains unaffected by the phenomenological 
reduction, it is transcendental (Husserl, pp. 102-3). At 
the same time, (2) "One consciousness is bound up with 
another so as to constitute one consciousness, of which 
the correlate is one noema" (Husserl, p. 307). Husserl 
credits the "unity of the immanent time-consciousness" 
with this accomplishment of "(binding) consciousness with 
consciousness" (Husserl, p. 307). Because of this 
essential unity, pure consciousness has the structure of 
an ego, and not a mere succession of transcendental 
"consciousnesses." It is both transcendental and an e g o — 
a transcendental ego. 
Sartre considers it impossible that the same immanent 
consciousness as reduced can be both transcendental and an 
ego. He begins with Eugen Fink's thesis that the 
reflecting 4 and the reflected-upon "I" can never be 
identical. The reflecting "I" is not immanently given in 
the act of reflection, but only the object of this 
reflection (the reflected "I," the "me") is given; and 
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this object, the "me," can never serve as subject-pole for 
a phenomenological reduction, for the obvious reason that, 
as reflected upon, it is an object. It stands outside the 
brackets of the reduction, just as does any scientific or 
historical claim. Essentially, then, says Sartre, if the 
transcendental ego cannot be immediately given to me in 
any of the particular moments of my consciousness, then it 
is nothing but a hypothetical construct which is both 
unknowable and unnecessary; but, on the other hand, if the 
ego could be given in some actual moment of consciousness, 
then it would no longer be the transcending unifier of all 
these moments of consciousness, but would be merely the 
content of one of them. Thus it would be no 
transcendental ego at all. 
I shall maintain on the contrary that the 
transcendental ego can be simultaneously both a principle 
of unification and an immanently experienced concrete 
consciousness; that to reflect on this consciousness is 
merely to attend to the respect in which it is directly 
and immediately conscious of itself as an unfolding (. . . 
"from" background noetic meaning contexts, "toward" ones 
yet to come . . .) which is part of the essence of 
phenomenological time. Any conscious experience, no 
matter how instantaneous or unitary, must in principle be 
experienced as more resembling a line segment than a 
point, in the sense that it shows this directional 
dimension. This directionality . of the immediate 
experience, which is experienced as such when we focus on 
the subjective meaning of the experience (the noesis), 
gives the subject of the experience a more direct affinity 
with the immediately preceding and. the immediately 
following experiences than it could ever have with a mere 
object of experience. Sartre can ignore this point only 
by failing to take adeguate account of the impossiblility 
in principle of there ever being experienced an exact 
present moment in the stream of consciousness. To 
experience an exact "now" in the temporal dimension would 
be analogous to experiencing a figure without a ground in 
the spacial dimension. Even the closest we could 
conceivably come to experiencing a "now" would reveal 
itself as already having part of its meaning inseparably 
bound up either with the immediately preceding moment, or 
the immediately following. And because of this inherently 
time-consuming character of even the simplest experience 
(which Sartre of course does not deny ), it becomes 
possible for consciousness to reflect on an essential 
aspect of itself, without thereby reducing itself or this 
aspect of itself to an object external to its own 
reflection. 
That our thinking here could be derived directly from 
Husserl would not seem completely far-fetched if„ we were 
to follow commentators like Ludwig Landgrebe and Gerd 
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Brand. But whether we do or not, it is clear that in 
order to contend with the Sartrean problem we must further 
clarify that property of the transcendental ego which 
allows it to become coincident with our concrete 
consciousness at the instant when a reduction is 
performed, and this property, we assert, is the felt 
experience of directionality in the immediate 
consciousness. 
With regard to the danger of psychologism, we must 
also show that this subjectively-sensed meaning which 
immanently discloses the direction of consciousness in its 
unfolding is the residuum of a phenomenological and not a 
psychological reduction, which it is, precisely because 
the reduction produces a coincidence between human and 
transcendental consciousness In the particular instant 
when the reduction is accomplished. Furthermore, " I , " the 
human being who performs the reduction, prereflectively 
already was essentially my transcendental ego. 
The argument then hinges on the question: Must we 
equate "reflection" by definition with making oneself into 
an object, or is it possible for "me," as my ongoing 
process of relatively unified experience, to "reflect" on 
the immanent consciousness (which has and can subjectively 
experience itself as having this directional aspect) in 
some other way than by making it into an intentional 
object? If so, then to focus on a "moment" in the flow as 
inherently meaningful only in terms of other moments, is 
to disclose, in however limited a fashion, the Husserlian 
transcendental ego. 
The importance of this problem has become increasingly 
obvious since the publication of The Transcendence of the 
Ego in 1937. If the impossibility of reflecting on the 
prereflective negates the possibility of a transcendental 
ego, then the philosopher performing the reduction can 
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points out. What seems to be an intuition of essence may 
be merely a "prejudice rooted in language,"* 6 or possibly S n l n Prevalent theoretical concepts and research paradigms and values of our historical situation " Nor 
could we ever be sure an imaginative variation had indeed 
varied culturally-relative attitudes of which we still may 
be unaware. In short, the whole phenomenological 
enterprise would be jeopardized, for there could be no 
method of overcoming the fragmentation of consciousness. 
Thus we must ask two interrelated questions, and 
answer them on Husserlian grounds, or at least on grounds 
that support the Husserlian view: 
(I) Is there a transendental ego, as distinguished from 
particular states of this ego's consciosness? 
(II) If so, how does the ego escape from the prejudices 
of the particular perspectives that limit all of its 
particular moments (thus rendering possible a 
phenomenological reduction)? (Conversely, how can we know 
whether the "essences" we intuit in the reduction are 
indeed true essences and not prejudiced and distorting 
category structures arising from the limited nature of 
each perspectival state of consciousness within the flow ! 
of consciousness?) 
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In the Crisis and in some of the later manuscripts, 
Husserl did in fact express an uneasiness about the 
relationship between his concept of the pure, disengaged 
transcendental subjectivity on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the corresponding concrete and human 
experiencing which necessarily sees and thinks from a 
situated point of view. 
Who are "we," as subjects performing the meaning- and 
validity-accomplishment of universal constitution? 
Can "we" mean "we human beings," human beings in 
the natural-objective sense, i.e., as real entities in 
the world? But are these real entities not themselves 
"phenomena" and as such themselves object-poles and 
subject matter for inquiry back into the correlative 
intentionalities of which they are the poles, through 
whose function they have and have attained their ontic 
meaning? 
If transendental subjectivity ultimately disengages itself 
from the real, psychophysical entity that "I" am in my 
everyday being, then from an ontological perspective the 
question arises: Where can the consciousness we call 
"transcendental" reside? Does not consciousness-as-
experienced become a mere phenomenon alongside others? 
And if so, then where is the "subjectivity" of 
transcendental subjectivity? Must it not derive from my 
own shadowy consciousness and thus remain pulled this way 
and that by my own prejudices, value^laden 
thematizations and limited category structures? Can 
the subject of the philosophical experience bracket 
himself? 
To confront this problem, we must proceed from 
Husserl's earlier discussions of attention, especially in 
the Fifth Logical Investigation, and then analyse the 
process whereby the consciousness of the present moment 
succeeds in transcending the limitations of the immediate 
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perspective, thus becoming the purely transcendental 
subjectivity which sees this limited perspective as a 
phenomenon in its own right. We shall demonstrate that 
(1) for a particular state of consciousness to decide to 
divorce itself from its own limited perspective, in order 
to relate this perspective to other- actual perspectives 
and to a whole horizon of other possible perspectives, is 
to become one's own transcendental ego. (2) To become 
one's own transcendental ego is to attend to a kind of 
consciousness which is already taking place within one, 
but on a prereflective level, which has the function of 
unifying one actual perspective with another, and finally 
with possible perspectives. This becomes most evident 
when the epoche is performed. Implicit interconnections 
which tie one intentional thread to another become visible 
when the epoche loosens those threads from their 
ordinarily constricted meanings. When consciousness 
attends to this preconscious network of interrelations of 
felt meanings, it becomes transcendentally unified by 
seeing the respect in which on a "preconscious" level it 
already is such a unity. (Here Sartre's discussion of the 
impossibility of "unconscious consciousness" will come 
into play.) 
It is true that Husserl concludes that the 
transcendental ego, on the whole, is different from the 
human, psychophysical ego. But he does not elaborate 
enough at this juncture in his writing as to what the 
ontological status of such an ego would have to be in 
light of the problem as later posed by Sartre, and as to 
whether the two egos can ever coincide in consciousness. 
However, if we compare what he says here with elsewhere, 
we can see at least one possible answer to the ontological 
question. Four pages after the above-quoted passage, 
Husserl says, 
Each human being 'bears within himself a 
transcendental "I"' . . . insofar as he is the self-
objectification, as exhibited through phenomenological 
self-rreflection, of the corresponding transcendental 
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The human person is therefore not to be considered 
ontologically prior to the transcendental ego. He merely 
is the sei f-objectif ication of this ego. "Self-
objectification" does not seem to refer to the process in 
which I, as the person I happen to be, objectify the 
person I happen to be; but rather, I as a person somehow 
get constituted in the process wherein this transcendental 
ego objectifies its self, and I end up being this 
objectification. At each instant, my transcendental ego 
seems to have already existed in some rudimentary form 
before 1 became the person with the perspective from which 
I now see—but to have existed prereflectively. By 
combining with the particular accidents of my life, it 
seems always previously to have produced a changing, 
idiosyncratic field of consciousness with the capacity to 
focus attention from any number of limited points of view, 
but floundering often aimlessly from one set of prejudices 
to another. My everyday consciousness, stuck in its own 
point of view, then becomes like a beam of light that 
shines forth but cannot illumine its own source. 
That the transcendental ego somehow precedes or 
underlies the concrete human being is also suggested by 
Husserl's view that., there is a different transcendental 
ego for every person. I have my transcendental ego and 
you have yours. This would be consistent with the 
supposition that the transcendental ego, which is achieved 
or would in principle be achieved in the performance of a 
complete epoche, is not some ideal state of consciousness 
which would be the same for everyone and which would do 
away with the individuality of the human being, but on the 
contrary is to be found already there in the existing 
consciousness of the human being, as the directed tendency 
of that person's consciousness toward its own 
amplification through explication, symbolization and the 
unpacking of meaning. 
Why does Husserl choose to introduce this theme of 
self-objectification at this point, rather than merely 
citing imaginative variation and suspension of the 
naturalistic viewpoint as means toward the epoche? It 
appears that, like Sartre, he regards these procedures 
alone as inadequate to the solution of the dilemma. The 
function of the epoche is to describe phenomena as they 
present themselves. But phenomena present themselves as 
having meanings or essences, so that a description of a 
phenomenon will make references to the phenomenon's 
essence. Although imaginative variation can help us to 
decide what is or is not properly called an essence, 
imaginative variation has its practical limitations, which 
in terms of the problem we are considering are crucial. 
Natural philosophers of old could not imagine a physical 
event without a material substratum, whereas modern 
physicists go so far as to question the meaning of the 
word "material." One thinker may see a unity of meaning 
exhibited where another denies it, as in the case of Kurt 
Goldstein's "impairment of abstract attitude," which many 
psychologists cannot intuit as an essential organismic 
phenomenon, but instead see as a manifestation of several 
other essential categories working together. In general, 
we may indeed try to vary the imagined objects along the 
lines of "existing in this or that cultural milieu," or 
"in light of different theoretical presuppositions," but 
never know for sure whether we have forgotten to vary just 
those aspects of phenomena which our cultural and 
theoretical attitudes do not easily dissociate, thus 
contaminating our seeing of the genuine essence or 
essences involved. Thus each person to some extent comes 
to an experience with conceptual or preconceptual 
categories which influence what essences he will see a 
phenomenon as exhibiting. His description should 
therefore include not only a description of the thing 
seen, but also of the system of categories that 
contributes to his perspective on the thing. 
This is precisely the problem, however, for nothing 
would seem to be accomplished by a description of this 
category structure in order to describe it. For to 
describe a category structure itself would leave out of 
account precisely those aspects of the category structure 
which limited or rendered inaccurate the conceptual 
categorization of the original phenomenon whose 
description was attempted. Thus it would appear that to 
attempt a description of one's own category structure 
would be like attempting to stand on one's own shoulders. 
This is just one instance of the conflict between human 
and transcedental consciousness. If my present 
consciousness is to be seen as merely an element of a 
larger totality, who sees it as such? And in seeing it as 
such, would not that consciousness necessarily have to 
reduce my consciousness to an intentional object? 
Husserl, as we shall see, was aware of this question 
long before Sartre and Merleau-Ponty asked it, yet he did 
not think that it necessitated any major revision of the 
basic fabric of his thought. He certainly did not abandon 
the transcendental ego, and with good reasons which the 
body of his work discloses. Without some transcendental 
function, the stream of consciousness would be like 
listening to an endless series of speeches, all equally 
elegant, all contradicting each other, and feeling swayed 
by each in its turn, with no appeal to any higher 
authority. Such a consciousness would more resemble the 
consciousness Straus attributes to an animal and to a 
person dreaming than it would the consciousness of a 
wakeful, thinking person capable of remembering past 
consciousnesses almost at will, and of creating a more 
comprehensive viewpoint which enables him to relate them 
to each other. Consciousness with no transcendentality 
would not be consciousness as it in fact presents itself. 
So conscious was Husserl of the problem of relating 
human to transcendental experience, that he at first 
rejected the transcendental ego as an idealistic 
hypothesis. At that early stage in his development, 
Husserl did not rule out the possibility that self-
consciousness might be non-intentional in some cases, but 
neither did he explore the possibility. But after making 
the transcendental function one of his main themes, he 
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began also to allow that the hyle or "stuff" of 
consciousness can be non-positionally conscious of itself 
without thereby necessarily making itself into an 
intentional object for some further consciousness. 
Transcendental subjectivity is a unity which we achieve by 
becoming aware of the unity already functioning (in the 
way described in the lectures on time consciousness) on a 
preconscious level. 
At this point, Sartre's analysis of the absurdity of 
positing an "unconscious consciousness" becomes crucial. 
How can the transcendental subjectivity be something 
already on-going in consciousness, which the concrete 
consciousness of this moment needs only to attend to in 
order to achieve its own transcendentality? Would this 
not involve positing the previous existence of the 
transcendental element (before we reflect on it) as a kind 
of unconscious consciousness? To answer this question, we 
must recall Husserl's treatment of attention as a 
conscious act. 
II 
In the second chapter of the "Fifth Logical 
Investigation," Husserl says that the process of attention 
is always intentional. His remarks on this subject 
become especially important for any attempt to treat the 
transcendental ego as something that is always 
prereflectively conscious until I suddenly choose to 
attend to it. Obviously, there can be such phenomena as 
prereflective consciousness in the sense, for example, 
that I can know that I know a name, yet not be able to 
remember it at that moment. This means that there is a 
content in consciousnesss to which at present I am not 
attending. But since any consciousness upon which 
attention is not focused is in this sense a prereflective 
consciousness, and since Husserl says that attention is 
always an intentional act, it would seem to follow that 
any consciousness to which attention is directed is a 
reflected consciousness, and therefore that if there is 
any consciousness which is not an intentional act, it can 
be non-intentional only in the mode of a prereflective 
consciousness. 
But this is the same as saying that any consciousness 
can be reflected upon only to the extent that it is either 
already intentional, or made into a mere intentional 
object by means of such reflection. Thus any 
consciousness which is not intentional is as such doomed 
to a permanently unreflected-upon status. Since Husserl 
says that all attention is intentional, however, then to 
become attentively aware of a consciousness which is 
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already there is to make this consciousness into the 
intentional object of this attentive awareness, which 
means that insofar as I am attentively aware of a non-
intentional consciousness (such as the non-positional 
self-consciousness of the transcendental ego), the latter 
is no longer a content in consciousness at all, but 
becomes the object of consciousness. As Husserl himself 
articulates in his lectures on time conscioxisness, "What 
is caused to appear in the moment-actual [Momentan-
Aktuellen] of the flux of consciousness is the past phase 
of the flux of consciousness in the series of retentional 
moments of this flux." 
The essential injustice of interpreting this statement 
as meaning that phenomenological reflection reduces the 
reflected-upon consciousness to an intentional object can 
be seen in Sartre's theory of emotion, v/hich seems to 
follow from the assumption of strictly universal 
intentional!ty. 
• But fear is not originally consciousness of being 
afraid, no more than the perception of this book is 
consciousness of perceiving the book . . . . 
Emotional consciousness is, first of all, 
consciousness of the world . . . . Thermotion is a 
certain manner of apprehending the world. 
But it is for this very reason that Husserl allows 
consciousness to be directly and non-intentionally 
conscious of itself in the sense of its pure flux-
character as revealed simply in the experience of 
directionality and already-ongoingness. If we assume a 
doctrine of radical transcendence such as the one Sartre 
expresses in his analysis of emotions, then it would be 
difficult to understand why it is that I take up this 
particular motivational stance toward the world as opposed 
to so many other motivational positions I could have taken 
up, and which ultimately would have resulted in different 
emotions. The teleological or emotional (and therefore 
temporal) directedness constituting my basic motivations 
and influencing in this way my interpretation of reality 
(through perspectival limitation, "bad faith," etc.) 
cannot be so reduced to consciousness of some object. If 
the motivation is not originary, but is rather a second 
order property of a perception, then there would be no way 
to account for the fact that what we see is always already 
motivated by our designation of the important parameters 
to look for as we bring phenomena into focus (the 
important Kantian influence on Husserl's Ideas). 
If it is true that we to some extent selectively 
attend to just those intentional objects to which it is 
convenient for us to attend (in our mundane 
consciousness), and ignore objects which it is convenient 
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to ignore, then the motivational stance out of which I 
implicitly decide to attend to this while ignoring that (a 
motivational stance therefore partly constitutive of my 
perspectival limitations and category structures) must be 
logically prior to the decision in question. This 
perspectival limitation has an important role in choosing 
which objects to make thematic. The motivational stance 
which influences the perspectival limitation in this way 
may well be intentional in a sense, but in another sense 
it cannot be. It is conscious on the level of "looking-
for" rather than "looking-at." In the same way, it is 
possible for the human person to "become" his own already-
functioning transcendental unity, without thereby making 
the subjectivity previously at work in that unification 
into an object. We must clarify what we mean by this 
"looking-for" kind of intentionality. 
Consider the example of a man who is told to check 
through a stack of tickets for all the ones numberd " 7 " : 
He may not really see the other numbers besides 7, but may 
only see in each case whether the number he glances at is 
or is not a seven. To a certain extent, we see only the 
aspects of phenomena we are interested in, and we come to 
an experience equipped with categories that reflect our 
interests. Categorial intentionality (as we shall call 
this broader type of intentionality) functions to 
facilitate experiencing, precisely by_ limiting it. If 
we had to approach the world without categorial 
intentions, we could never make enough "inferences": from 
"sense data" to organize our experience meaningfully. The 
distinction is not merely between being presentatively 
aware of a generality of meaning, and being presentatively 
aware of a more specific fulfillment of that meaning. 
Rather, the meaning-intention is a looking-for the 
fulfillment of a certain experienced meaning, whereas the 
presentative-intention which fulfills this meaning-
intention is a looking-at the object that fulfills the 
meaning. The word "intend" in the two cases describes an 
entirely different functional relation to the object. 
For Husserl, of course, the meaning-intention is 
itself a presentative intention having the pure species as 
its obejct. But, in principle this presentative meaning-
intention itself presupposes some, other, prior categorial 
intention or looking-for which would lead me to look at 
and to grasp the essence of the species in question. And 
When I look at this looking-for, I find that some other 
looking-for must have led me to be interested in making 
this apprehension as opposed to others 1 could have made 
instead. Every presentative intention (whether ' of an 
individual or of a species) is a figure which presupposes 
as its ground a categorial (more general and "looking-
for") intention. This movement from categorial to 
presentative intentionality is one instance wherein the 
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moment-transcending quality öf experiencing makes itself 
self-evident in reflection, without becoming an intention 
object in its own right. 
The intentionality (if any) accompanying such a way of 
experiencing must be a very broadened kind, and certainly 
not the narrower mode of looking-at. And at the same 
time, it must be the hyletic phase to which Husserl points 
when he says, 
Not every real phase of the concrete unity of an 
intentional experience has itself the basic character 
of intentionality, the property of being a 
"consciousness of something." This is the case, for 
instance, with all sensory data, which play so great a 
part in the perceptive intuition of things . . 
The content which presents the whiteness of the paper 
as it appears to us . . . is the bearer of an 
intentionality, but not itself a consciousness of 
something. The same holds of other data of 
experience^ of the so-called sensory feelings, for 
instance. 
There must be a variety of instances in the experiencing 
process wherein I am able to be conscious of the on-going 
experiencing process subjectively, and not merely by 
•reflecting on it in an objectifying sense, which would 
make it the object for some other state of my 
consciousness to inspect as if from a distance; otherwise 
it would never be possible to feel anything at all, but 
merely to be presentatively aware that I was feeling or 
had been feeling some way, which would be absured if I did 
not in fact feel that way. 
The question remains, can we apply these concepts to 
Sartre's argument against the transcendental ego? "Ego," 
for both Sartre and Husserl, implies the transcending 
unity across time of the many moment-actuals comprising 
the stream of consciousness. Sartre says that the 
transcendental "1" would have to be either the direct 
consciousness of this moment, or a transcending unity 
which "has" all of these particular feelings. If I am the 
former, then the transcendence across- time cannot be 
explained; if the latter, then "I" would not myself be a 
consciousness, since all the states of consciousness would 
be ontologically distinguished from what "1" am. 
However, it would seem that there is the possibility, 
in fact the necessity, that I am both. In the directional 
experience of the "looking-for," for example, 1 am this 
motivation to see, which at the same time is already felt 
on the one hand (thus it is a concrete consciousness), yet 
on the other hand also unifies all the other 
consciousnesses of the intentional complex by motivating 
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the order and pattern in which my circumspective gaze 
looks around in its looking-for and therefore also in its 
looking-at. One unitary source, from which this gaze 
ultimately takes its direction, at the same time that it 
is consciousness of a transcendent object, can also be 
directly conscious of itself (as having the character of a 
directional, on-going process). In the naturalistic 
viewpoint, when I live primarily in the looking-at which 
results from the process, this self-consciousness is non-
thetic and prereflective. (It is also possible to look at 
myself in this objectifying way, but then no coincidence 
is guaranteed between the human and the transcendental 
"self.") But if this always-presupposed "looking-for" 
categorial intentionality should choose to involve itself 
in a phenomenological reduction, to just this extent I 
become aware of the hooks and arrows connecting my 
seemingly objective worldview with the prior interest-
motivated pattern in the systematic direction of 
attention, that is, with my category structure or 
perspectival limitation. The perspectival limitation, 
which is now part of the directly felt subjectivity of the 
time during which this experience takes place, becomes 
conscious of itself. Then in the instant when this 
limited category structure attends to itself 
intentionally, it automatically changes: At least some of 
the prejudice which formerly limited it (and which it 
formerly was, being its own limitation through selective 
attention) is now in the process of dropping away. And 
precisely in this experiencing of the change in our 
perspective, we experience consciousness itself as having 
a direction, from something to something (and these 
somethings themselves are not at this moment experienced 
as isolated moments of consciousness, but as further-away 
segments of the same flow). We then see that its meaning 
cannot be described in terms of an immediate "now" which 
in reality is only an abstraction. The experience, 
rather, exhibits the unity of a flow from one perspective 
to another, and this flow—which is both unifying and 
directly experienceable—is the transcendental ego. 
We do not therefore conclude that " I , " in the instant 
that I become conscious of myself as my transcendental 
ego, am nothing more than the original teleological 
directedness of my category structure, nor would Husserl 
say this. We do say, however, that this is at least one 
example of what goes on in the "self-objectification of 
the transcendental ego," and that experienceable 
directionality in general allows a commensurability 
between human and transcendental subjectivity. The 
possibility of this commensurability in turn ensures the 
possbility of a phenomenological reduction. 
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